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THE “THREAT” OF MARRIAGE FRAUD: 
A STORY OF PRECARITY, EXCLUSION, 
AND BELONGING 
Sarah Pringle* 
Migrants can obtain permanent residency in Canada under 
the family-reunification category set out in s. 12(1) of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 
Canadian citizens or permanent residents may apply to 
sponsor their non-citizen spouse, common law or conjugal 
partner, or other relatives to move to Canada pursuant to 
s. 117(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Regulations (IRPR). The bad-faith clause under s. 4(1) of 
the IRPR requires spousal-sponsorship applicants to prove 
to visa officers that, on a balance of probabilities, their 
relationship is “genuine” and not “entered into primarily 
for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under 
the [IRPA]”. The bad-faith clause is meant to prevent so-
called marriage fraud: the idea that migrants, hoping to 
take advantage of the family-reunification regime, trick 
vulnerable Canadians into marriage and then 
subsequently abandon them once they have obtained 
citizenship status. Drawing on the work of feminist, anti-
racist, and anti-colonial scholars, this paper argues that 
the construction of marriage fraud as a threat to national 
security rationalizes an increasingly exclusionary spousal-
sponsorship regime post 9/11. Focusing on this “threat” 
detracts from the insidious naturalization of the neo-
liberal, hetero-patriarchal, and white settler–colonial 
values that animate the exclusionary nature of family class 
migration—values that pre-date the recent moral panic 
over marriage fraud. This paper concludes by sounding a 
cautionary bell: Canadians must be wary of the ongoing 
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reproduction and sedimentation of exclusionary values 
that give meaning to legal constructions of family because 
they reinforce and perpetuate experiences of precarity 
among migrants who live on the underside of global 
capitalism.  




Canadian immigration history is replete with examples of 
exclusionary policies enacted in the name of national 
security.1 As early as 1872, Canada’s immigration regime 
sought to exclude migrants that the state identified as 
potential security risks.2 While the individuals and groups 
labelled as risks have shifted over time, the emphasis on 
 
*  University of Victoria, Faculty of Law. 
1  See Sharryn J Aiken, “Manufacturing ‘Terrorists’: Refugees, National 
Security, and Canadian Law” (2000) 19:3 Refuge 54 at 54. For 
examples of how “national security” has been used to justify the 
policing of minorities more broadly within Canadian society, see: Gary 
William Kinsman, Dieter K Buse & Mercedes Steedman, eds, Whose 
National Security?: Canadian State Surveillance and the Creation of 
Enemies (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2000). 
2  See Aiken, supra note 1 at 60–61. Aiken provides a comprehensive 
overview of the evolution of the “security risk” in Canada’s 
immigration regime. The earliest articulation of the amorphous 
“security threat” appeared in an 1872 amendment to the Immigration 
Act, which provided that “[t]he Governor in Council may, by 
proclamation, whenever he deems it necessary, prohibit the landing in 
Canada of any criminal, or other vicious class of immigrants, to be 
designed by such proclamation.” In 1910, Parliament added s. 41 to the 
Immigration Act, which added to the list of prohibited classes: “any 
person other than a Canadian citizen [who] advocates in Canada the 
overthrow by force or violence in the Government of Great Britain or 
Canada, or other British Dominion, Colony, possession or dependency, 
or the overthrow by force or violence of constitutional law or 
authority”. The scope of section 41 was widened during the “Red 
Scare”, and in the inter-war period the Immigration Act provided 
government officers with broad discretionary powers to exclude 
individuals on the grounds of national security. 
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security has remained constant.3 This is particularly 
apparent in the years following the collapse of the World 
Trade Center Towers in 2001, as anti-immigrant 
sentiments gained significant traction in North American 
discourse.4 Arguably, this trend accelerated with President 
 
3  See ibid at 61–62 (summarized and quoted in this note). Aiken argues 
that in the wake of the “Red Scare” and increasing labour unrest 
following World War I, Canada used the Immigration Act to bar entry 
or deport “anarchists and revolutionaries” who were primarily 
suspected communists and union organizers. During World War II, 
Canada’s immigration regime provided government officers with 
broad discretionary powers to exclude “enemy aliens” on the grounds 
of national security. In the post-war period, fear of Soviet infiltration 
was the primary security concern guiding immigration policy. In the 
1960s, Aiken argues that “[t]he driving force behind measures of 
national security and immigration control. . . was the Anglo-Saxon fear 
that the influx of foreigners threatened the nation’s ‘racial purity’ 
and/or political fabric.” In 1977, Parliament established the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, better 
known as the McDonald Commission, which investigated allegations 
that the Royal Canadian Mountain Police subjected many groups, 
including civil dissidents, to surveillance, infiltration, and “dirty tricks” 
under the guise of protecting “national security.” The McDonald 
Commission’s second report condemned the overly broad 
interpretation of “threats to the security of Canada” in the context of 
immigration screening. Aiken argues that Parliament failed to act on 
the recommendations of the McDonald Commission, and the safety 
and security of Canada continued to feature prominently in Canada’s 
admissibility requirements.  
4  See e.g. Muhammad Safeer Awan, “Global Terror and the Rise of 
Xenophobia/Islamophobia: An Analysis of American Cultural 
Production since September 11” (2010) 49:4 Islamic Studies 521. At 
525, Awan argues that “[i]n the wake of 9/11 attacks, due to the myth-
making capabilities of the American corporate media, new ‘fears of the 
other’ or the immigrant, have been systematically induced in the minds 
of the American public.” This is particularly true for Muslim 
immigrants, who are often conflated with the threat of terrorism. 
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Trump’s political ascendency, imbuing xenophobia with 
an unbefitting air of legitimacy.5 
Thus, it is no coincidence that Canada’s cardinal 
immigration law, the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act (IRPA),6 emphasizes national security concerns.7 
 
Commenting on the rise of islamophobia in the United States, Ghazali 
notes that “the events of 9/11 were used as an excuse to greatly magnify 
the hostility toward Muslims and cloak it in pseudo-patriotism.” Abdus 
Sattar Ghazali, Islam & Muslims in the Post-9/11 America (Modesto: 
Eagle Enterprises, 2008) at 19, cited in ibid at 525. 
5  See e.g. Sabrina Siddiqui, “Anti-Muslin rhetoric ‘widespread’ among 
candidates in Trump era – report”, The Guardian (22 October 2018), 
online: <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/22/anti-muslim-
rhetoric-widespread-among-candidates-trump-era>; Meg Wagner, 
Brian Ries & Veronica Rocha, “Supreme Court upholds travel ban”, 
CNN Politics (27 June 2018), online: <www.cnn.com/politics/live-
news/supreme-court-travel-
ban/h_a32feeafac5231eeded28002e2b2de9d>; Willa Frej, “Trump 
Retweets Inflammatory Islamophobic Videos”, Huffington Post (29 
November 2017), online: <www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/trump-
retweets-british-far-right_n_5a1e9cd9e4b0cb0e917caaa1>. 
6  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. 
7  See Robert M Russo, “Security, Securitization, and Human Capital: 
The New Wave of Canadian Immigration Laws” (2008) 2:8 Intl J 
Humanities & Soc Sciences 877 at 881. Russo comments that IRPA 
ultimately emphasized national security and public safety, rather than 
increasing efficiency and refugee protection measures as initially 
intended. He further explains that in the aftermath of the attacks on 11 
September 2001, the government quickly promoted the proposed 
reforms as Canada’s much needed response to the perceived impending 
threat of terrorists. See also Anna Pratt, Securing Borders: Detention 
and Deportation in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). According 
to Pratt, “[t]he government, far from countering the fear-laced 
expressions of anti-immigrant, anti-refugee sentiments that followed 
the attacks, mobilized and affirmed this fear, further entrenching the 
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Enacted three months after 9/11, the IRPA proposes to be 
“tough on those who pose a threat to Canadian security.”8 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, mainstream 
American media accounts constructed Canada as a 
“terrorists’ haven” because the “enemy” could easily 
infiltrate the state’s supposed open-border policies.9 Critics 
 
associations between crime-security and fraud and new immigrants 
and refugees.” Together, the Anti-Terrorist Act, SC 2001, c 41 and 
IRPA comprise Canada’s two-pronged contribution to the “War against 
Terrorism.” Ibid at 3. 
8  See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
Canada’s Actions since the September 11 attacks: Fighting 
Terrorism—a Top Priority (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2003), archived online: 
<web.archive.org/web/20030924050538/www.dfait.gc.ca/can-
am/menu-en.asp?act=v&mid=1&cat=10&did=1684>, cited in Erin 
Kruger, Marlene Mulder & Bojan Korenic, “Canada after 11 
September: Security Measures and ‘Preferred’ Immigrants” (2004) 
15:4 Mediterranean Quarterly 72 at 77. For further analysis on how the 
IRPA was designed to counter “security threats”, see: Audrey Macklin, 
“Borderline Security” in Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent 
Roach, eds, The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-
Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 383. 
Macklin explains at 384 that: “[t]he Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act casts a wide net over non-citizens rendered inadmissible 
on security grounds, expands the detention power over designated 
security risks, and reduces access to independent review of Ministerial 
security decisions.” 
9  See Sunera Thobani, Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race 
and Nation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) at 
242. See also Colin Freeze, “Canada tarred again as safe haven for 
terrorists”, The Globe and Mail (26 April 2002), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-tarred-again-as-
haven-for-terrorists/article4134106/>. This fear mongering continues 
to this day. See e.g. John R Schindler, “Canada and the Emerging 
Terror Threat From the North”, The Observer (17 December 2015), 
online: <observer.com/2015/12/canada-and-the-emerging-terror-
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have observed that since 2001, the Canadian imaginary has 
conflated this so-called enemy with immigrants from 
certain countries, leading to calls for increased 
securitization and surveillance at the border.10 In a time 
where xenophobia is on the rise around the world,11 there 
could not be a more critical moment to interrogate the ways 
in which Canadian laws produce and sustain systemic 
discrimination against migrants who come to this country 
hoping to build a better life. 
The family-reunification category codified under 
s. 12(1) of the IRPA is one pathway to citizenship in 
Canada. Known more commonly as the spousal 
sponsorship program, the family class system permits 
Canadian citizens or permanent residents to sponsor their 
non-citizen spouse, common law, or conjugal partner, as 
well as other relatives, to migrate to Canada pursuant to 
s. 117(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
 
threat-from-the-north/>. In Schindler’s article, he warns that “nobody 
really knows how many terrorists are lurking in Canada.” Throughout 
the article, Schindler refers to the “threat” posed by America’s northern 
border as the radical Jihadists (which he often refers to simply as 
“Muslims”) who have flocked to Canada because of the government’s 
historically open approach to immigration and its weak border security 
practices.  
10  See Kruger, Mulder & Korenic, supra note 8 at 72–87. See also 
Thobani, supra note 9.  
11  See e.g. John Cassidy, “It’s Time to Confront the Threat of Right-Wing 
Terrorism”, The New Yorker (16 March 2019), online: 
<www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/its-time-to-confront-the-
threat-of-right-wing-terrorism>. Cassidy documents the correlation 
between the rise of white nationalism and the violent massacres 
perpetrated by white supremacist terrorists in recent years. 
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Regulations (IRPR).12 If an immigration officer approves 
the sponsorship application, the migrant spouse obtains 
permanent residency.13 
A spousal-sponsorship application must satisfy the 
bad-faith clause under s. 4(1) of the IRPR. Applicants must 
prove to visa officers that, on a balance of probabilities,14 
their relationship is “genuine” and not “entered into 
primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or 
privilege under the [IRPA].”15 The task of the visa officer 
 
12  Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. The 
IRPA grants broad regulatory power to the Minister so that many of the 
substantive rules are contained within regulations and can be created 
without recourse to Parliament. See Lorne Waldman, Canadian 
Immigration & Refugee Law Practice (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 
2018) at 17. 
13  See Chantal Desloges, Cathryn Sawicki & Lynn Fournier-Ruggles, 
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law: A Practitioner’s Handbook, 
2nd ed (Toronto: Edmond, 2017) at 207. 
14  In Gonzalez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 
FC 201 at para 15, the Federal Court clarified that “[t]o say the burden 
of proof was upon the applicant is not the same as saying there was a 
presumption that the marriage was entered into for immigration 
purposes.” Minor inconsistencies do not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion of bad faith. 
15  This requirement is codified in s. 4(1) of the IRPR: “For the purposes 
of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be considered a 
spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partner of a person if the 
marriage, common-law partnership or conjugal partnership (a) was 
entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or 
privilege under the Act; or (b) is not genuine.” Neither the IRPR nor 
the IRPA defines “genuine”, but in Sandhu v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 834 [Sandhu], the Federal 
Court adopted the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration 
Refugee Board’s statement that: “[g]enuineness of the marriage may 
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is to determine “what was going on in the applicant’s head, 
or arguably, heart.”16 Ultimately, a Canadian immigration 
officer exercises their discretion to approve or refuse the 
application.17 
The bad-faith clause responds to the so-called 
threat of marriage fraud: a narrative advanced by 
politicians across the spectrum18 that migrants, hoping to 
 
often be assessed through external manifestations and may be 
evidenced by the degree of interaction and consequent knowledge 
demonstrated by the [couple].” Genuineness will be returned to in Part 
IV of this paper.  
16  See Gill v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2012] 
IADD No 624 [Gill] at para 19, as cited in Sandhu, supra note 15 at 
para 14. Desloges, Sawicki & Fournier-Ruggles, supra note 13, 
provide the following examples of the type of evidence that may be 
required. When assessing the genuineness of a marriage, the visa 
officer will evaluate whether a wedding actually took place by 
reviewing photographs, certificates and other documents (ibid at 222); 
if the couple is common-law, the officer will review documentation 
proving cohabitation, and in some instances, conduct interviews, and 
occasionally surprise home visits (ibid at 222). Conjugal relationships, 
on the other hand, are an exception that only apply when marriage or 
common law partnerships are not possible (ibid at 214). Evidence must 
be provided that shows significant commitment, notwithstanding that 
the couple did not get married, and do not cohabitate (ibid at 214). This 
may include: “insurance policies or estates showing that they have 
named each other as beneficiaries; documents showing that they hold 
joint ownership of possessions; and documents showing that they hold 
joint expenses or shared income” (ibid at 214). 
17  See Vic Satzewich, “Canadian Visa Officers and the Social 
Construction of ‘Real’ Spousal Relationships” (2014) 51:1 Can Rev 
Sociology 1 at 4. 
18  The Harper government’s anti-marriage-fraud campaign video is still 
on the Government of Canada’s website. See it here: Government of 
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take advantage of s. 12(1), trick vulnerable Canadians into 
marriage and then abandon them once they have obtained 
citizenship status. The data proving that this phenomenon 
is prevalent, let alone on the rise, is ambiguous at best. 
Concrete evidence put forward by lobbyist groups, 
politicians, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and 
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)19 
fails to provide a consistent picture.20 On one hand, groups 
like the Canadians Against Marriage Fraud, former 
Immigration Minister Jason Kenney, and the IRCC suggest 
that there are thousands of victims in Canada—even as 
many as 1,500 defrauded each year.21 On the other hand, 
 
Canada, “Marriage Fraud: Stories From Victims” (date modified: 8 
June 2018), online: The Government of Canada 
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/news/video/marriage-fraud-stories-victims.html>.  
19  Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) was renamed IRCC in late 
2015 by the Liberal government.  
20  See Megan Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family: The (Re-) Production 
of Conjugal Citizens through Canadian Immigration Policy and 
Practice (PhD Dissertation, Queen’s University, 2013) [unpublished] 
at 208–09 [Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family].  
21  Canadians Against Marriage Fraud alleges that 1,500 Canadians fall 
victim to marriage fraud each year. See Zosia Bielski, “Many 
Canadians who sponsor a foreign spouse find themselves jilted”, The 
Globe and Mail (30 April 2009), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/life/relationships/many-canadians-who-
sponsor-a-foreign-spouse-find-themselves-jilted/article570171/>. 
Former Immigration Minister Jason Kenney claimed that there were 
thousands of victims in Canada. See Jason Kenney, “Speaking Notes 
at an Event to Announce Changes to Spousal Sponsorship” (News 
Conference to Announce Changes to Spousal Sponsorship, 
Mississauga, 2 March 2012), online: 
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
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reports from the CBSA suggest that these numbers are 
inflated. Between 2008 and 2010, there were 200 cases 
reported, only seven of which resulted in charges.22 
Similarly, between 2010 and 2014, there were 392 referrals 
made to CBSA, resulting in seven charges laid, with only 
three concluding with a guilty finding.23 The exaggerated 
numbers are misleading due to the difference between 
reported incidences of marriage fraud and proved cases of 
marriage fraud.24 
Politicians have not explained the inconsistent 
evidence of marriage fraud in legislative proceedings. 
Rupaleem Bhuyan, Anna C Korteweg, and Karin Baqi 
found that members of Parliament regularly ask 
representatives of the IRCC to share the rates of fraud in 
light of recent attention to the issue. 25 While avoiding 
 
citizenship/news/archives/speeches-2012/jason-kenney-minister-
2012-03-02.html>. IRCC has reportedly stated that 1,000 fraudulent 
marriages are reported per year. See Raveena Aulakh, “Fastest Way to 
Get Into Canada—marriage”, The Star (16 July 2010), online: 
<www.thestar.com/news/canada/2010/07/16/fastest_way_to_get_to_c
anada_marriage.html>. 
22  See The Canadian Press, “Marriage fraud targeted by Canada border 
agency”, CBC News (1 November 2011), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news/politics/marriage-fraud-targeted-by-canada-
border-agency-1.1003652>.  
23  See House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and 
Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 41-2, No 15 (4 
March 2014) at 1543 (Mr Geffrey Leckey (Director General, 
Enforcement and Intelligence Operations Division, CBSA)).  
24  See Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family, supra note 20. 
25  See Rupaleem Bhuyan, Anna C Korteweg & Karin Baqi, “Regulating 
Spousal Migration through Canada’s Multiple Border Strategy: The 
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giving any tangible evidence, IRCC’s responses reproduce 
two assumptions: (1) that fraud is real and can be 
accurately detected and (2) that visa officers require more 
resources to improve their capacity to detect fraud.26 This 
cyclical logic masks the fact that no problem has been 
proved with any degree of certainty in the first place. 
Although touted as an issue of national concern, it is 
difficult to know whether, and to what extent, this threat 
actually exists. 
Drawing on the work of feminist, anti-racist, and 
anti-colonial scholars, this paper argues that the 
construction of marriage fraud as a threat to national 
security rationalizes an increasingly exclusionary spousal-
sponsorship regime post 9/11. Focusing on this threat 
detracts from the insidious naturalization of the neo-liberal, 
hetero-patriarchal, and white settler–colonial values that 
animate the exclusionary nature of family class migration 
—values that pre-date the recent moral panic over marriage 
fraud. We must be wary of the ongoing reproduction and 
sedimentation of such values, because they reinforce and 
perpetuate experiences of precarity among migrants who 
live on the underside of global capitalism.27 
 
Gendered and Racialized Effects of Structurally Embedded Borders” 
(2018) 40:4 Law & Pol’y 346 at 354. 
26  See ibid. 
27  The use of the term precarity throughout this paper is informed by the 
work of Judith Butler. See Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life 
Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009) at 25: all life is “precarious” 
because it “can be expunged at will or by accident…[its] persistence is 
in no sense guaranteed.” In this sense, “precariousness” describes “the 
fact that one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the other. It 
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This paper will be structured as follows. The first 
section sets the foundation by explaining how stories 
around terrorist threats and national security have been 
used to justify heightened scrutiny of prospective 
immigrants in the years since 9/11. The second section 
situates the purported threat of marriage fraud within this 
climate of fear by demonstrating how it resulted in 
intensified securitization of Canada’s borders. The third 
section evaluates how the exclusionary nature of spousal 
sponsorship reveals the underlying neo-liberal, hetero-
patriarchal, and white settler–colonial assumptions of 
Canada’s immigration system. The fourth section turns to 
how these theoretical underpinnings manifest in tangibly 
precarious conditions for migrants who are deemed 
undesirable by the Canadian state. The final section calls 
for a subversive retelling of this story, rendering visible the 
divisive, authoritarian, and exclusionary settler state 
practices that operate under the guise of national security 
and maintain global relations of inequality and oppression. 
 
implies exposure both to those we know and to those we do not know.” 
Ibid at 14. Importantly, although all lives are equally defined by 
precariousness, it does not follow that all lives are equally precarious; 
indeed, for Butler, precarity is unequally distributed, leaving some 
bodies more vulnerable to violence than others. Although political 
orders are designed to address the needs, Butler deploys the term 
precarity to designate the “politically induced condition in which 
certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks 
of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and 
death.” Ibid at 25. These populations live in the vanguard of war, 
neoliberalism, and climate crises, and are denied the social value and 
recognition that is ascribed to others. Such populations are at 
“heightened risk of disease, poverty, starvation, displacement, and of 
exposure to violence without protection.” Ibid. 
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In embarking on this project, I am mindful of how 
Canada’s nation-state continues to occupy Indigenous 
land, and how notions of national identity have historically 
been predicated on the Othering of migrants of colour and 
Indigenous peoples. In the words of Indigenous scholar 
Andrea Smith, “a liberatory vision for immigrant rights is 
one that is based less on pathways to citizenship in a settler 
state, than on questioning the logics of the settler state 
itself.”28 
II. DISCOURSES AROUND TERRORISM AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST-9/11 ERA 
In order to understand the panic surrounding marriage 
fraud, we must first situate it within a cultural moment 
where white settler societies have become increasingly 
hostile to migrants of colour, and Muslims in particular. In 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, mainstream media 
identified the “enemy” as the “radical Muslim” who was 
seen as “anti-Western, fanatic, and uncivilized in nature.”29 
In contrast, Western settler nation-states, like America and 
Canada, were framed as bastions of liberalism, democracy, 
freedom, and the rule of law.30 Edward Said explains this 
 
28  See Andrea Smith, “Foreword” in Harsha Walia, Undoing Border 
Imperialism (Oakland: Institute for Anarchist Studies, 2013) at 2. 
29  See Thobani, supra note 9 at 218. 
30  See ibid at 222. In reality, the forcible displacement of migrants at 
greater rates than ever before is by virtue of a global political economy 
driven by Western colonialism and capitalism: Walia, supra note 28 at 
54. For example, people from Afghanistan and Iraq compose the 
world’s largest recent refugee populations. Harsha Walia points out 
that “[w]ith decades of foreign intrusion, including the US and NATO 
occupations that began in 2001, these two countries have been subject 
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dichotomy, observing that the West constructs its own 
sense of identity out of stories premised on the 
“ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and 
Oriental inferiority.”31 
The War on Terror is symptomatic of this Western-
centric worldview. Countries in the West invade the 
Middle East under the assumption that Eastern countries 
pose a threat because “they detest our freedoms, they detest 
our society, they detest our liberties.”32 Migrants from 
these countries, in turn, come to embody this perceived 
assault on Western values and freedoms. 
Importantly, in the post-9/11 era, the climate of fear 
and distrust is pervasive, directed indiscriminately at 
Muslims and other groups marked by difference. Critical 
race and feminist scholar Sunera Thobani points out that: 
[i]f the figure of the Muslim is today being 
used to represent the most potent threat to 
 
to the destruction of their infrastructure, privatization of their 
economies, interference in their governance, and military missions that 
have killed and tortured over one million people”: ibid. Thus, the 
migrants are displaced from a context devastated by western 
interventions, which may be described as imperialist, extending and 
imposing Western rule over the Middle East “colonies”: ibid at 41–42.  
31  See Thobani, supra note 9 at 228, quoting Edward Said, Orientalism: 
Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, 1978). 
32  Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff described the “opponent” in 
Afghanistan as “detestable murderers and scumbags, I’ll tell you that 
right up front. They detest our freedoms, they detest our society, they 
detest our liberties.” Daniel Leblanc & Shawna Richer, “He’s 
Armoured, But He’s Not Thick”, The Globe and Mail (30 July 2005), 
cited in Thobani, supra note 9 at 235. 
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national security, the racialization of the 
categories ‘Muslim’ and ‘immigrant’ means 
that all people of colour who ‘look’ like 
‘Muslims’ (that is, who are Black and 
Brown), are being constituted as part of this 
danger, regardless of their legal status.33  
  It is within this context that Western stories of 
threat frame deviations from whiteness as something to be 
feared; something that challenges Canada’s own national 
identity as a freedom-loving democracy. Thus, the 
heightened anxieties around the Radical Muslim within the 
(white) national psyche post 9/11 increased suspicion of all 
racialized migrants. 
III. SECURING CANADIAN BORDERS AGAINST 
THE “THREAT” OF MARRIAGE FRAUD 
Concerns about marriage fraud emerge within this wider 
moral panic about “keeping borders safe and secure” from 
the Other who seeks to “penetrate” North America’s 
“vulnerable shores.”34 In 2009,35 then Immigration 
Minister Jason Kenney launched an aggressive campaign 
aimed at cracking down on marriage fraud, arguing that 
“. . . [it] poses a significant threat to our immigration 
 
33  Ibid at 246. 
34 See Walia, supra note 28 at 54. 
35  See Megan Gaucher, A Family Matter: Citizenship, Conjugal 
Relationships, and Canadian Immigration Policy, (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2018) at 122 [Gaucher, A Family Matter]. According to 
Gaucher, the issue of marriage fraud did not receive much attention 
before the government’s policy position was identified in 2010. 
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system.”36 After conducting a series of town hall meetings 
across the country, Kenney became a spokesperson for the 
cause.37 Under his leadership, the government of Canada 
released numerous videos that shared victim’s stories and 
warned Canadians that the danger of marriage scams was 
on the rise.38 He claimed that this “abuse of the system” has 
victimized thousands of innocent Canadians, who were 
“being lied to and deceived.”39 Where the sponsor is 
complicit in the operation, Kenney argued that marriage 
fraud amounts to human smuggling.40 Kenney also warned 
that the livelihood of all Canadians are implicated; 
marriage fraud takes its toll on “our taxpayer benefits such 
as health care” and other social services, including 
welfare.41 
Although the Liberal government repealed one of 
the legislative changes enacted by the former Harper 
government, which will be elaborated on later in this 
article, the former Immigration Minister under Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau, Ahmed Hussen, was sure to 
emphasize that the Liberal government was “doubly 
 
36  Kenney, supra note 21.  
37  See Steven Meurrens, “Addressing Concerns About Marriage Fraud”, 
Policy Options Politiques (9 November 2017), online: 
<policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-2017/addressing-
concerns-about-marriage-fraud/>. 
38  See Kenney, supra note 21. 
39  See ibid. See also Christina Gabriel, “Framing Families: Neo-
Liberalism within Canadian Immigration Policy” (2017) 38:1 Atlantis 
179 at 187.  
40  See Kenney, supra note 21. 
41  Ibid.  
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committed” to combatting the threat of marriage fraud like 
its predecessor.42 Indeed, much of Kenney’s anti-marriage-
fraud campaign remains on the government’s website. For 
example, it still cautions Canadians to “think carefully 
before marrying someone and sponsoring them to come to 
Canada” because “[s]ome people think marriage to a 
Canadian citizen will be their ticket to [citizenship].”43 
This section will show how the fear around 
marriage fraud legitimized stricter enforcement of 
Canada’s borders, traceable in two broader transformations 
to the spousal-sponsorship program. First, legislative 
changes were enacted, including a widened bad faith 
clause, a five-year sponsorship restriction, and a 
conditional permanent resident provision. Second, 
procedural changes were implemented, including 
specialized training and the expansion of anti-fraud units 
beyond Canada’s borders. As will be explained at the end 
of this section, while these changes took place to the 
spousal-sponsorship program, the government expanded 
its security and surveillance mechanisms targeting 
 
42  See Kathleen Harris, “Liberals ‘doubly committed’ to tackling 
marriage fraud while ending 2-year spousal residency rule”, CBC News 
(28 April 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberal-
immigration-marriage-fraud-1.4090694>. 
43  Government of Canada, “Protect Yourself from Marriage Fraud” (last 
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migrants applying under all immigration classes, both here 
and abroad. 
A. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
In 2010, under the direction of Kenney, IRCC increased the 
number of marital, common-law, or conjugal relationships 
that could be excluded on the grounds of bad faith. Before 
2010, visa officers denied applications under the bad-faith 
clause only where the relationship was both disingenuous 
and entered into primarily for immigration purposes.44 In 
2010, the IRCC changed the wording of the provision to a 
disjunctive test; now, either element can compromise an 
application and there is no need for both. In other words, 
an application can be rejected if it was genuine but entered 
into primarily for immigration purposes, or if it was 
disingenuous but not entered into primarily for 
immigration purposes. Since the onus is on the applicant to 
prove that the relationship was entered into in good faith 
on a balance of probabilities, an applicant must now negate 
both elements to have a successful application.45 
 
44  See e.g. Gill v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CanLII 
62947 (Immigration Appeal Division), as cited by Stephen Green & 
Alex Stojicevic, Chair, National Citizenship and Immigration Law 
Section of the Canadian Bar Association, “Regulations Amending the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (Bad faith), Canada 
Gazette, Part I” (3 April 2010), online: The Canadian Bar Association 
<www.cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=6b689ddd-0057-4f42-
90aa-4e69da411349> [Green & Stojicevic]. The Immigration Appeal 
Division found that although it appeared the applicant entered into 
marriage with the appellant primarily for immigration reasons, it was 
nonetheless a genuine relationship of permanence. 
45  See Desloges, Sawicki & Fournier-Ruggles, supra note 13 at 222. 
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Writing on behalf of the National Citizenship and 
Immigration Section of the Canadian Bar Association, 
Alex Stojicevic criticized the change, arguing that a 
disjunctive test may be prejudicial to cultures that practice 
arranged marriages where immigration prospects are an 
important factor to be considered.46 As well, it may be 
illogical, potentially targeting couples who choose to marry 
in order to stay together, with a genuine intention to be with 
one another permanently.47 
The next year, along with creating a tip line to 
report citizenship fraud,48 Kenney’s department introduced 
two regulations that further tightened spousal sponsorship 
as a pathway to Canadian citizenship. First, he introduced 
a five-year sponsorship restriction for sponsored spouses, 
beginning on the day they are granted permanent residence, 
as a way to deter the “revolving door” of family status 
migrants coming to Canada.49 Second, he introduced the 
controversial conditional permanent residence (CPR) 
 
46  See Green & Stojicevic, supra note 44 at 3–4. 
47  See ibid. 
48  See Gloria Suhasini, “A new tip line to report citizenship fraud” (15 
September 2011), online: Canadian Immigrant 
<canadianimmigrant.ca/news/a-new-tip-line-to-report-citizenship-
fraud>. 
49  See Steven Meurrens, “Sponsorship bar and conditional permanent 
residency in effect” (9 February 2013), online: Canadian Immigrant 
<canadianimmigrant.ca/immigrate/sponsorship-bar-and-conditional-
permanent-residency-in-effect>.  
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provision,50 which instituted a two-year co-habitation 
requirement for newcomers sponsored by their spouses. 
The CPR provision was subsequently repealed by 
the Liberal government because it fuelled widespread 
concern that forcing spouses to cohabitate for two years 
exacerbated vulnerabilities among victims of domestic 
abuse. Although the CPR had an exception for spouses who 
were subject to abuse or neglect, critics argued that it 
nonetheless deterred individuals from coming forward 
because, not only were they in fear that they would lose 
their permanent-residence status, they also were greatly 
reliant on their sponsors due to vulnerabilities such as 
language proficiency, isolation, and financial 
dependence.51 Since they are more likely to come to 
Canada as dependent spouses52 and because women are 
 
50  See the Liberal government’s official statement on the repeal, where 
they emphasize their commitment to family reunification and 
prevention of gendered sexual violence. Government of Canada, 
“Notice – Government of Canada Eliminates Conditional Permanent 
Residence” (28 April 2017), online: Government of Canada 
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/news/notices/elminating-conditional-pr.html>. 
51  See Gaucher, A Family Matter, supra note 35 at 144. 
52  “In 2017, the sponsored spouses, partners and children category was 
composed of 57% women and 43% men.” Hon Ahmed Hussen, 
Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, “2018 
Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration” (last modified 26 
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more likely to be subject to abuse,53 this was seen to have 
a disproportionate impact on female migrants. 
That being said, the problem of vulnerability 
among spouses who are subject to abuse still exists, 
notwithstanding the repeal of the CPR provision. As will 
be expanded on below, the government still does not 
provide any socio-economic support to sponsorship 
recipients. Without access to a social safety net, abused 
spouses remain deeply reliant on their sponsors for 
financial and social support in a time of significant 
alienation and cultural transition. 
B. PROCEDURAL RESPONSES 
Along with these legislative measures, the government 
enacted several changes to the way in which spousal-
sponsorship applications are processed. In 2012, Kenney 
announced that visa officers54 would complete 
“supplementary marriage-fraud identification training”, 
 
53  See e.g. Government of Canada, “Family violence: How big is the 
problem in Canada?” (last modified 31 May 2018), online: 
Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/public-
health/services/health-promotion/stop-family-violence/problem-
canada.html>.  
54 See Government of Canada, “Inventory: Foreign Service Development 
Program” (last modified 16 June 2020), online: Government of Canada 
Jobs <emploisfp-psjobs.cfp-psc.gc.ca/psrs-
srfp/applicant/page1800?toggleLanguage=en&poster=1200120>. The 
immigration officers who process and decide applications are stationed 
within Canadian embassies, high commissions, and consulates in other 
countries. They are Canadians who work abroad, employed through 
the Foreign Service Development Program.  
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the specifics of which the government never revealed to the 
public.55 
However, in 2015, immigration lawyer Steven 
Meurrens obtained a three-page training guide through an 
access-to-information request.56 Titled “Evidence of 
Relationship”, the guide contained red flags that visa 
officers ought to look out for. Examples of supposed red 
flags included “university-educated Chinese nationals 
marrying non-Chinese”, “sponsor is uneducated, with a 
low-paying job or on welfare”, and couples who had “no 
diamond rings”.57 Predictably, the guide caused an uproar 
in the media, with many alleging that racist, classist, and 
cultural stereotypes pervade training for border officials. 
The red flag targeting Chinese applicants was no 
surprise for those who followed the anti-marriage fraud 
campaign. Kenney’s department was very explicit about 
how applications from certain countries, namely India and 
China, should be viewed with heightened suspicion. It was 
alleged that Indian and Chinese applicants were more 
likely to be part of sophisticated networks of organized 
marriage fraud. Singling out India specifically, in 
Citizenship and Immigration Committee meetings, Kenney 
referred to a “wall of shame” at the Canadian visa office in 
the Indian city of Chandigarh, comprised of accumulated 
forged documents, including fake death certificates and 
 
55  Gaucher, A Family Matter, supra note 35 at 145. 
56  See Nicholas Keung, “Immigration guide for Detecting marriage fraud 
called ‘racist and offensive’”, Toronto Star (19 May 2015), online: 
<www.thestar.com/news/immigration/2015/05/19/immigration-
guide-for-detecting-marriage-fraud-called-racist-and-offensive.html>.  
57  Ibid. 
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university diplomas.58 Yet, scholar Megan Gaucher points 
out that both the government and the IRCC failed to prove 
that marriage fraud is higher in these countries and that this 
level of suspicion is warranted.59 Indeed, the government 
provided minimal empirical data to support this claim.60 
Nonetheless, the application process became 
increasingly intensive in India and China. The differential 
treatment of applicants from certain countries led one 
immigration officer to observe: “[c]ase assessment is 
entirely dependent on the area in which you’re located. 
When I was in London, cases were rarely refused. When I 
was stationed in Delhi, couples were considered guilty 
until proven innocent.”61 Anti-fraud units were established 
in New Delhi and China, and all applicants had to be 
interviewed abroad to quell concerns about marriage fraud. 
Here we see what Rupaleem Bhuyan, Anna C Korteweg, 
and Karin Baqi speak of when they argue that threats of 
fraud operate as a device that extends the frontier of 
Canadian border control beyond Canada’s territory.62 By 
fixating on China and India and establishing enforcement 
mechanisms beyond Canadian borders, immigration 
officers detect and intercept what are perceived as 
undesirable migrants before they even enter Canada.63 
 
58  See Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family, supra note 20 at 225.  
59  See ibid at 226–27. 
60  See ibid. 
61  Gaucher, A Family Matter, supra note 35 at 150. 
62  See Bhuyan, Korteweg, & Baqi, supra note 25. 
63  See ibid. 
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As we have seen, the purported threat posed by 
marriage fraud justified a series of restrictive measures that 
tightened spousal sponsorship as a pathway to citizenship. 
However, it is important to point out that this part of the 
immigration regime was already exclusionary. The recent 
crackdown on marriage fraud is only the most recent 
example in a long history of legislative measures aimed at 
protecting a certain version of the Canadian family. 
Although Canada’s immigration regime has 
historically purported to prioritize family reunification, 
certain types of families have been afforded easier passage 
than others: namely, families that emulate, in organization 
and socio-economic background, the Canadian nuclear 
family.64 As Gaucher argues, family reunification “is about 
the state producing and reproducing a desirable familial 
form through the provision of citizenship.”65 In the next 
section, this paper will expand on how family class 
migration is deeply informed by biases that allow for the 
inclusion of some people over others. 
 
64  See Cindy L Baldassi, “DNA, Discrimination and the Definition of 
Family Class: M.A.O. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration)” (2007) 21 J L & Soc Pol’y 5 at 29–30. An obvious 
example is Canada’s history of prohibiting or restricting the entry of 
migrant families from specific countries or racial backgrounds. See 
ibid at 6. See e.g. Agnes Calliste, “Race, Gender and Canadian 
Immigration Policy: Blacks from the Caribbean, 1900–1932” (1993–
94) 28:4 Journal of Canadian Studies 131; Beverley Baines, “When is 
Past Discrimination Un/Constitutional? The Chinese Canadian 
Redress Case” (2002) 65:2 Sask L Rev 573 at 585. 
65  Gaucher, A Family Matter, supra note 35 at 19. 
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IV. NEO-LIBERALISM, HETERO-PATRIARCHY, 
AND WHITE SETTLER–COLONIALISM 
The fears surrounding marriage fraud expose three 
underlying forces that give meaning to ideas around 
Canadian citizenship. First, consistent with the wider neo-
liberal ideology that animates Canada’s immigration law, 
the intensified scrutiny of spouses reflects an active effort 
to exclude migrants who are seen as potential financial 
burdens on the welfare state. Second, the normative logic 
guiding the genuineness assessment of marital, common 
law, and conjugal relationships reinforces white hetero-
patriarchal ideas of marriage and marriage-like 
relationships. Third, by only recognizing marriages 
solemnized through formalistic law here and abroad, the 
assessment process evinces a continued propagation of 
settler–colonial ideas in the construction of the desirable 
migrant subject. I will deal with each in turn. 
A. NEO-LIBERALISM 
As Abu-Laban and Gabriel observe, under neo-liberal 
logic, “the ‘best’ immigrants are those whose labour-
market skills [would] enhance Canada’s competitive 
position in a world economy.”66 Migrants deemed “self-
sufficient” and “highly skilled” are actively sought after.67 
 
66  Yasmeen Abu-Laban & Christina Gabriel, Selling Diversity: 
Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity and Globalization, 
(Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2002) at 62, cited in Gaucher, A 
Family Matter, supra note 35 at 62. 
67  See Gabriel, supra note 39 at 181. Ironically, economic-class migrants 
include both “the principal applicant and spouses and dependents of 
the applicant if they migrate together.” But since “the principal 
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Meanwhile, migrants who are viewed as needy are not only 
given less priority, but also targeted as security concerns 
who merit stricter conditions.68 Given that sponsored 
spouses are explicitly thought of as dependants, family 
class migrants are considered an undesirable group due to 
the potential financial drain on the welfare state. There is 
an assumption “that ‘dependent’ family members lack 
skills and are unproductive, and that people of the ‘wrong’ 
origins make excessive use of the family reunification 
program.”69 
The spousal-sponsorship regime prevents family 
class migrants from becoming the fiscal responsibility of 
the state in two ways. First, it disincentivizes participation 
in the program because applicants are subject to the 
undertaking requirement. The undertaking amounts to a 
“de facto privatization of basic social security”70 by 
ensuring that the full financial responsibility of the 
incoming migrant rests on the sponsor. As alluded to in the 
introduction, under the IRPR, a sponsor must undertake to 
become financially responsible for spouses for a duration 
 
applicant is the public face of this category”, the stigma of dependents 
is overshadowed by the primary applicant’s perceived “human capital 
and ability to contribute to Canada’s global competitiveness.” Ibid.  
68  See Chizuru Nobe-Ghelani, “Inner Border Making in Canada: Tracing 
Gendered and Raced Processes of Immigration Policy Changes 
Between 2006 and 2015” (2017) 77 Can Rev Soc Policy 44 at 47. 
69  Gillian Creese, Isabel Dyck & Arlene Tigar McLaren, “The ‘Flexible’ 
Immigrant? Human Capital Discourse, the Family Household and 
Labour Market Strategies” (2008) 9:3 J Intl Migration & Integration 
269 at 270 as cited by Gabriel, supra note 39 at 181. 
70  Gabriel, supra note 39 at 182. 
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of at least three years.71 This means that the sponsor 
ensures that the family members are supported so that they 
will not require social assistance from the government. If 
social assistance payments are made, the sponsor agrees to 
repay the government in full. Once this undertaking is in 
force, the sponsor cannot revoke it for any reason, 
including relationship breakdown, abuse, or fraud. If 
sponsors are deemed to have defaulted on their 
undertaking, they will not be allowed to sponsor other 
family members until they have repaid the government. 
The second way that the spousal-sponsorship 
regime prevents unwanted costs on the welfare state is by 
requiring sponsors, who immigrated to Canada themselves, 
to disclose any dependents in their initial immigration 
application. That way, immigration officials can assess the 
risk of any future financial liability before even granting 
the primary applicant citizenship. Section 117(9)(d) of the 
IRPR provides that the failure of a sponsor to disclose a 
dependent at the time they applied for permanent residency 
will result in those undisclosed dependents being excluded 
from the family class in the future.72 The obligation to 
disclose begins at the time the application is filed and 
continues until permanent residence is granted. 
 
71  However, if they also sponsor dependent children, it could be as long 
as ten years or until they turn twenty-two, whatever comes first. See 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 
132(1)(b). 
72  See de Guzman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
2005 FCA 436. This provision has been upheld as intra vires and 
constitutional by the Federal Court of Appeal.  
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Although aiming to deter misrepresentation, this 
requirement prevents permanent residents from acting as a 
sponsor even where their non-disclosure was innocent or 
unintended. An applicant’s intentions or reasons for non-
disclosure are irrelevant under s 117(9)(d).73 This has at 
times produced absurd results. In Munganza v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),74 the applicant 
did not disclose his wife and child because he thought they 
had died in a civil war. Consequently, the wife and child 
could not apply under the family class pursuant to 
s. 117(9)(d) of the IRPR.75 The only available recourse that 
applicants have to overcome the overly broad and harsh 
effects of this provision is to apply for consideration on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds.76 
 
73  See Desloges, Sawicki & Fournier-Ruggles, supra note 13 at 217. 
74  Munganza v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 
FC 1250 [Munganza]. 
75  In Munganza, supra note 73, the Federal Court at para 13 states: “I am 
prepared to accept that the applicant was not aware that his wife and 
children were still alive when his application for permanent residence 
was filed. This situation has no effect on the application of paragraph 
117(9)(d) of the Regulations. The Regulations are clear: paragraph 
117(9)(d) does not make any distinction with regard to the reason for 
which there was no mention of the non-accompanying family members 
in the application for permanent residence. What is important is that 
result of the non-disclosure was that these members were not examined 
by an immigration officer. In this case, it is true that the applicant could 
not disclose what he did not know, but the wording of the Regulations 
is clear and unequivocal; subjective knowledge regarding a false 
statement or non-disclosure is contemplated in the Regulations.” 
76  See Deheza v Canada (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship), 2016 FC 1262, cited in Desloges, Sawicki & Fournier-
Ruggles, supra note 13 at 207. 
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By requiring the sponsor to enter into an 
undertaking and disclose their dependents, the state ensures 
that any costs associated with integration into Canadian 
society rests with the individual sponsor. Consequently, 
only those who are sufficiently financially secure may 
sponsor spouses. Indeed, the state ensures that this is the 
case by barring sponsorship applications from individuals 
who are on social assistance, in default of child or spousal 
support, already in default under IRPA, or who are 
undischarged bankrupts. The consequence of calibrating 
immigration policy to the needs of Canada’s national 
economic project is that the border systemically deprives 
migrants who are perceived as indigent, or even potentially 
indigent, of equal access to Canadian citizenship. In the 
words of Nobe-Ghelani, such exclusionary border 
practices create two categories of migrants: those who are 
deserving of Canadian rights and entitlements, and those 
who are not. 77 Here, the undeserving migrant is one who 
poses a financial risk to the state. 
Marriage fraud undermines the ability of the state 
to prevent the migration of individuals presumed to pose a 
financial risk. Sponsored spouses who abscond from their 
partners may not have the economic and social support that 
would otherwise be guaranteed by a sponsor. Thus, such 
spouses are viewed as more likely to amount to a long-term 
economic burden on the state. 
 
77  Nobe-Ghelani, supra 68 at 50. 
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B. WHITE HETERO-PATRIARCHY 
The threat posed to the state by sponsored spouses is not 
just financial. A closer look at the application criteria for 
the spousal-sponsorship program reveals that Canadian 
immigration law facilitates the reproduction of white 
heteropatriarchy through the privileging of the conjugal, 
monogamous, nuclear family. As pointed out by Jamie R 
Wood, this family form operates to “cast other 
structures . . . as deviant, dangerous and unworthy of equal 
recognition.”78 Problematically, families that orient 
themselves around norms other than those of conjugality 
and monogamy—kinship formations that challenge 
heteropatriarchy—are excluded from this framework. 
1. Conjugality 
The assessment criteria that determines whether a 
relationship is genuine relies upon certain assumptions 
around what comprises the idealized family. One such 
assumption is that marriages and marriage-like 
relationships must be conjugal in nature.79 The IRPA and 
IRPR do not define the word conjugal, but its central 
features derive from the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in M v. H.80 The Court provided a non-exhaustive list of 
indicia for conjugal relationships drawn from the decision 
 
78  Jamie R Wood, “Moving Beyond the Bedrooms of Our Nation: 
Redefining Canadian Families from the Perspective of Non-Conjugal 
Caregiving” (2008) 13:1 Appeal 7 at 11. 
79  Under the spousal-sponsorship program, conjugality is a requirement 
for citizenship for spousal applicants. See Gaucher, Keeping it in the 
Family, supra note 20. 
80  M v H, [1999] 2 SCR 3 at para 59, 171 DLR (4th) 577. 
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of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Molodowich v. 
Penttinen,81 including shared shelter (sleeping 
arrangements), sexual and personal behaviour (fidelity, 
commitment, feelings toward each other), services 
(conduct and habit with respect to the sharing of household 
chores), social activities (their attitude and conduct as a 
couple in the community and with their families), 
economic support (financial arrangements, ownership of 
property), children (attitude and conduct concerning 
children), and societal perception of the couple.82 
According to Megan Gaucher, these relational attributes 
reflect how “conjugal relationships are measured against 
characteristics believed to be part of the ideal marriage”,83 
or more specifically, “how judges imagine marriage ought 
to be.”84 
Under the Molodowich framework, what separates 
a conjugal/marital relationship from a mere economic 
partnership is the presence of emotional and physical 
intimacy, care, and fidelity—features that are fundamental 
to social constructions of the Western nuclear family.85 By 
binding intimacy to citizenship, Anne Marie D’Aoust 
suggests that “technologies of love” play a role in 
regulating migration flows, disciplining those migrants 
 
81  Molodowich v Penttinen, [1980] OJ No 1904 (QL), 17 RFL (2d) 376 
(ONSC) [Molodowich]. 
82  See Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family, supra note 20 at 63. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder,“What is Marriage-Like Like? The 
Irrelevance of Conjugality” (2001) 18:2 Can J Fam L 269 at 290, as 
cited in ibid. 
85  See Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family, supra note 20 at 68. 
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who do not embody Western narratives of romance and 
kinship. 86 Additionally, emphasis on care87 reinforces 
social constructs of idealized domesticity, reproducing 
heteronormative and gendered divisions of labour within 
the household. Finally, the cherishing of fidelity inscribes 
monogamy as the naturalized kinship formation; as will be 
explained below, this comes at the exclusion of more 
radical conceptions of family and gender relations. 
While same-sex couples are eligible to apply under 
the spousal-sponsorship regime,88 only those couples that 
embody narrow racial, class, gender, and national ideals of 
 
86  See Anne Marie D’Aoust, “In the Name of Love: Marriage Migration, 
Governmentality, and Technologies of Love” (2013) 7:3 Int’l Political 
Sociology 258 at 263–64. 
87  See Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development, 2nd ed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993). In this work, the feminist scholar introduces the concept 
of “an ethic of care” to describe the differential moral development 
among women that emphasizes attentiveness, responsibility, 
competence, and responsiveness in interpersonal relationships and 
conflict. Gilligan’s work is critical of how, by reason of being 
feminized, “an ethic of care” is devalued. Instead, under her view, an 
“ethic of care” is a human strength which can and should be taught to, 
and expected of, everyone. However, in the context of assessing 
conjugality in spousal-sponsorship applications, “care” is likely not 
expected in the same way for both parties. Since patriarchal gender 
roles inform the viewpoint under which these assessments are made, 
the ability of a woman migrant to care for her sponsor would likely be 
more carefully scrutinized than vice versa. Given that the regime, 
through undertakings, reifies a relationship of economic dependency, 
sponsored spouses/partners are often embedded within a domestic 
hierarchy that reproduces an unequal, gendered division of labor.  
88  See Desloges, Sawicki & Fournier-Ruggles, supra note 13 at 236–38. 
This is subject to an important caveat: the marriage must be legal both 
in Canada and the applicant’s home country. 
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conjugality satisfy the legal requirement of genuineness. 
Rahul Rao describes the mainstream acceptance of some 
queer relationships as “the ruse through which neoliberal 
capitalism pretends to become more inclusive.”89 
Meanwhile, relationships that defy hegemonic 
understandings of conjugality are still relegated to the 
margins. 
By predicating citizenship on the performance of 
conjugality, the sponsorship regime reproduces the nuclear 
family as the cornerstone to Canada’s ideal kinship 
formation. This is reflective of how, according to Eithne 
Luibhéid and Lionel Cantú, the state ascribes membership 
to those whose sexual values correspond with national 
values.90 Under this view, immigration control acts as a 
mechanism for “constructing, enforcing, and normalizing 
dominant forms of heteronormativity while producing 
figures as supposed threats.”91 
 
89  See Rahul Rao, “Global Homocapitalism” (2015) 194 Radical 
Philosophy 38 at 44, 47. 
90  See Eithne Luibhéid & Lionel Cantú, eds, Queer Migrations: 
Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship and Border Crossings (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), as cited by Gaucher, Keeping it 
in the Family, supra note 20 at 40. Gaucher summarizes Luibhéid’s 
argument as follows: “Luibhéid defines heteronormativity as ‘a range 
of normalizing discourses and practices that seek to cultivate and 
privilege a heterosexual population while nonetheless insisting that 
heterosexuality is ‘natural’ and timeless rather than a product of 
economic, society, culture and political struggle’ (2008, 296). For 
Luibhéid, immigration scholarship disregards connections between 
heteronormativity, sexuality and immigration, despite the fact that 
sexuality ‘structures every aspect of immigrant experiences (2004, 
227).’”  
91  See Gaucher, supra note 20 at 40. 




As we have seen, monogamy is a crucial element in the 
assessment of whether a marital, common law, and 
conjugal relationship is genuine. This means that the 
spousal-sponsorship regime prohibits polyamory. Since 
the spousal-sponsorship regime requires that the marriage 
be legal under Canadian law,92 spouses of polygamous or 
bigamous relationships, which are explicitly prohibited due 
to their criminalization under ss. 293 and 290 of the 
Criminal Code,93 are inadmissible. 
Polygamy has been seen as a familial arrangement 
that undermines the institution of marriage, the Canadian 
family, and society at large.94 Some feminists would agree 
with this characterization, arguing that women are 
disenfranchised in such relationships and Canada should 
not endorse them within its borders.95 Admittedly, to the 
extent that they reinforce gendered hierarchies, some 
polygamous familial formations can be extremely 
 
92  See the definition of marriage under s. 2 of the IRPR. 
93  Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. As will be explained below, 
provisions in the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, 
SC 2015, c 29, specifically target polygamy as an inadmissible union 
within the spousal-sponsorship program. 
94  See Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family, supra note 20 at 49–50. 
95  See e.g. West Coast LEAF, “Polygamy Reference [2010]” online: West 
Coast LEAF <www.westcoastleaf.org/our-work/polygamy-reference-
2010/>. This details West Coast Leaf’s submission as an intervener to 
the BC Supreme Court’s Polygamy Reference. 
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exploitative, especially where there are “issues with lack of 
consent, and abuse of women and children.”96 
However, we should not be so quick to dismiss or 
essentialize non-monogamous familial relations. 
Polygamous relationships are not inherently problematic 
and in fact, may be emancipatory in certain contexts. For 
example, some feminists have argued that polygamy 
presents a possible remedy to the inequitable division of 
household labor by “[providing] a ‘sisterhood’ within 
marriage, [generating] more adults committed to balancing 
work/family obligations, and [allowing] more leisure time 
for each wife.”97 Elizabeth Joseph, a lawyer and 
polygamist wife in Utah, went so far as to describe her life 
as representing “the ultimate feminist lifestyle.”98 
Whether or not that’s true, Michelle Chan points 
out that “[w]hile the practice of polygamy is certainly not 
without problems, neither is the practice of monogamy.”99 
Indeed, feminists have long critiqued monogamy as a 
central feature of the nuclear family, which perpetuates 
 
96  See Gillian Calder, “Penguins and Polyamory: Using Law and Film to 
Explore the Essence of Marriage in Canadian Family Law” (2009) 21:1 
CJWL 55 at 80. 
97  Adrienne D Davis, “Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, 
and Bargaining for Equality” (2010) 110:8 Colum L Rev 1955 at 1972. 
98  Ibid at 1973. John Tierney, Op-Ed, The New York Times (11 March 
2006) online: <select.ny-times.com/2006/03/1 
1/opinion/11tiemey.html>, as cited by Michelle Chan, “Beyond 
Bountiful: Toward an Intersectional and Postcolonial Feminist 
Intervention in the British Columbia Polygamy Reference” (2011) 16 
Appeal 15 at 23.  
99  Davis, supra note 97 at 1973. 
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“inequality, gender roles, gender hierarchy, and male 
power.”100 Beyond that, monogamy far from guarantees a 
successful relationship: as of 2008, “43.1% of Canadian 
marriages are expected to end in divorce before the couple 
reaches their 50th wedding anniversary.”101 It seems 
hypocritical to base Canada’s immigration policy around 
the idea that monogamy is the only way to achieve 
domestic bliss when that ideal is not a reality for many 
Canadian families. 
Decrying polygamy and upholding monogamy as 
the idealized alternative also reflects how the social 
construction of family in Canada is laden with racist 
assumptions. Critical race legal scholar Adrien Katherine 
Wing notes that “in the twenty-first century, polygamy 
continues to exist in many parts of the world, particularly 
countries where women of color live.”102 Though neutral 
on its face, the exclusion of polygamous spouses 
disproportionately impacts applicants of colour, while also 
buttressing a national identity built upon Euro-Western 
value systems. Nowhere is this more explicit than the Zero 
Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, enacted by 
 
100  See Jyl Josephson, “Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage, and Feminist 
Critiques of Marriage” (2005) 3:2 Perspectives on Politics 269 at 270. 
101  See Tavia Grant, “Statistics Canada to top tracking marriage and 
divorce rates”, The Globe and Mail (20 July 2011), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/statistics-canada-to-stop-
tracking-marriage-and-divorce-rates/article4192704/>.  
102  See Adrien Katherine Wing, “Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black 
Britannia to Black America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal 
Reform for the Twenty-first Century” (2001) 11:2 J Contemp Leg 
Issues 811 at 812. 
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the Harper government in 2014.103 The spousal-
sponsorship program was already anchored in monogamy 
by allowing a permanent resident to sponsor only one 
spouse, but the Bill took this one step further by adding the 
practice of polygamy as a new ground of inadmissibility. 
Then Immigration Minister Chris Alexander stated that 
“[w]e intend [on] sending a very clear message to anyone 
coming to Canada that such practices are unacceptable.”104 
Sherene Razack observes that Westerners point to 
Eastern practices of polygamy as backwards and barbaric 
patriarchal violence, which in turn, constructs Western 
civilization as progressive and free from gender 
oppression.105 Thus, the exclusion of polygamous 
relationships from Canada’s spousal-sponsorship regime is 
not only related to the continued centrality of the nuclear 
family; it arises from discourses that reinforce “the 
dichotomy between a civilized, Western ‘Us’ and a 
barbaric, non-Western ‘Them’.”106 
 
103  Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, supra note 93. 
104  See The Canadian Press, “Feds to ban ‘barbaric’ cultural practices” (5 
November 2014), online: Global News 
<www.globalnews.ca/news/1654800/tories-to-ban-polygamous-
immigrants/>. 
105  See Sherene Razack, “Imperiled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim 
Men and Civilised Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced 
Marriages” (2004) 12 Fem Legal Stud 129, as cited by Chan, supra 
note 98 at 24. 
106  Ibid; Chan, supra note 98 at 17. 
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By privileging monogamy and engaging in 
Orientalist discourses, the spousal-sponsorship regime 
neuters polygamy’s potential to disrupt the (white) nuclear 
family as the naturalized kinship form. We are left with a 
further sedimentation of a white hetero-patriarchal 
institution at the centre of Canada’s body politic, to the 
detriment of more radical imaginings of gendered and 
racial relations in society. 
C. THE NATURALIZATION OF SETTLER–
COLONIAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The dissonance between policy and reality is also evident 
when considering the naturalization of settler–colonial 
sovereignty, and how it has informed immigration policy. 
By only recognizing state law as a means in which a 
marriage can be solemnized, Canada’s spousal-
sponsorship program reinforces the legitimacy of the 
colonial nation state by erasing the historical and 
contemporary existence of Indigenous laws. The IRPR 
require that foreign marriages be “valid both under the laws 
of the jurisdictions where it took place and under Canadian 
law.”107 Therefore, marriages that occur according to 
Indigenous law are not legal for the purposes of spousal 
migration. 
In this way, Canada’s spousal-sponsorship scheme 
fails to recognize the sovereignty of Indigenous legal 
orders around the world. Yet, this should not be surprising: 
the very idea of the Canadian state acting as an arbiter in 
determining if and under what conditions people migrate is 
predicated on the erasure of Indigenous law. Critical to the 
 
107  See the definition of marriage under s. 2 of the IRPR. 
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legitimacy of the claim that the “Crown acquired radical or 
underlying title to all the land”108 is the displacement of 
Indigenous people and their laws from the historic 
landscape. This displacement is the basic premise of terra 
nullius (“nobody’s land”),109 which has been used to 
legitimize colonial expansion for centuries. Indigenous and 
critical race scholars have long contended that the driving 
force of Canada’s nation-building project is the ongoing 
colonization of Indigenous land, people, and history.110 
Canada’s spousal-sponsorship scheme is yet another 
example of how the Canadian state buttresses its own 
legitimacy by undermining Indigenous legal orders. 
Obtaining citizenship through unregulated means 
undermines the authority of the settler state to assert 
sovereignty over the territory known as Canada. This raises 
larger questions about the legitimacy of the settler state and 
its control over, and proprietary relationship to, territory. 
Such questions cannot be meaningfully addressed within 
the parameters of this paper, but warrant further thought, 
research, and action. 
 
108  See Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 12. 
109  See ibid at para 69. 
110  See Thobani, supra note 9; Aman Sium, Chandni Desai & Eric Ritskes, 
“Towards the ‘tangible unknown’: Decolonization and the Indigenous 
future” (2012) 1:1 Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 
1; Adam Joseph Barker, Being Colonial: Colonial mentalities in 
Canadian Settler society and political theory (MA Thesis, McMaster 
University, 2003) [unpublished]. 
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Within the confines of this project, a story worth 
telling still emerges: the desire to protect colonial 
sovereignty, neoliberalism, and white hetero-patriarchy 
illuminates why marriage fraud constitutes such a threat in 
the Canadian imaginary—it not only imposes a cost on the 
state; it also disrupts the nation’s own story about itself by 
denaturalizing what is seen as objective truths regarding 
the conjugal family and Canadian sovereignty over its 
borders. 
As Sara Ahmed points out, “[t]hese narratives or 
scripts do not, of course, simply exist ‘out there’ to legislate 
the political actions of states. They also shape bodies and 
lives.”111 The next section departs from the theoretical, in 
the hope of portraying how these systems operate in 
tangible and violent ways in everyday life for migrants 
living in the borderlands.  
V. COLLATERAL HARMS OF EXCLUSIONARY 
APPROACHES TO SPOUSAL MIGRATION 
This paper has aimed to demonstrate that Canadian 
citizenship is predicated on one’s ability to perform 
spousal-hood according to Western notions of neo-
liberalism, white hetero-patriarchy, and settler colonial 
identity. Framing certain people as threats to justify their 
exclusion reinforces conditions of precarity amongst non-
status women in Canada.  
 
 
111  See Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 2nd ed (Edinburgh, 
UK: Routledge, 2014) at 145. 
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Migrant women who find their way to Canada, and 
for whom spousal-sponsorship applications have not been 
successful, may have no choice but to remain here in the 
shadows, dodging the watchful gaze of immigration 
officials in order to avoid forcible return to localities 
afflicted by political, social, and economic unrest. This 
section will focus on the plight of non-status migrant 
women, who live in constant fear of deportation, to further 
delineate how constructions of the ideal citizen 
compromise the livelihoods of those who exist in the 
margins. In doing so, I hope to further problematize why 
people denied status are labelled threats to national 
security. 
In an open letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, 
the Non-Status Women’s Collective of Montreal asks that 
the government live up to its promise to “take immediate 
steps to reopen Canada’s doors, and . . . make reuniting 
families a top priority.”112 For these women, “who live and 
work in the shadows, invisible and excluded”,113 precarity 
characterizes everyday existence. As Peter Nyers observes, 
“[f]or non-status immigrants, the borderline is not just at 
physical entry points at ports, airports, and land crossings. 
Rather, the border exists wherever and whenever they try 
to claim the rights of social citizenship.”114 There is no 
 
112  See Non-Status Women’s Collective of Montreal, “Open Letter from 
the Non-Status Women’s Collective of Montreal” (10 January 2016), 
online: Solidarity Across Borders 
<www.solidarityacrossborders.org/en/open-letter-from-the-non-
status-womens-collective-of-montreal>.  
113  Ibid. 
114  See Peter Nyers, “Community without Status: Non-Status Migrants 
and Cities of Refuge” in Diana Brydon & William D Coleman, eds, 
 
 THE “THREAT” OF MARRIAGE FRAUD 43 
 
 
infrastructure in place to ensure that non-status women are 
able to meet their basic needs and those of their children.115 
For example, non-status migrants have restricted access to 
social services, including public education, healthcare, 
food banks, and subsidized housing.116 
Not only do they live under the constant fear of 
deportation and without access to social services, non-
status migrant women do not have the ability to participate 
in the regulated workforce. Jobs open to non-status women 
have been described as dead-end jobs that are rife with 
problematic labor conditions.117 As Roxana Ng notes: 
They are available on short-term, temporary, 
or even on an emergency basis. Working 
hours are also extremely irregular, ranging 
from a temporary, on-call basis in domestic 
and kitchen work to shift work in factories 
and hotels. Very few of them . . . are protected 
by labour standard legislation and union 
contracts. Fringe benefits . . . are not 
provided.118 
Thus, even if they are able to work, that work is 
precarious and not amenable to the cultivation and 
 
Renegotiating Community: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Global 
Contexts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 123 at 129. 
115  See ibid at 129–30. 
116  Ibid at 127, 130. 
117  Roxana Ng, “Managing Female Immigration: A Case of Institutional 
Sexism and Racism” (1992) 12:3 Can Women Studies 20 at 22. 
118  Ibid.  
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sustenance of a life lived with dignity. Moreover, language 
and job training programs, which may facilitate the ability 
to integrate into Canada’s labour market, not only risk 
exposure to immigration authorities, they are also 
expensive, and therefore inaccessible to those who are 
already economically insecure. 
Non-status migrants also cannot access the justice 
system because to do so may risk deportation.119 This is 
especially problematic in situations of domestic and sexual 
violence. Non-status women who report abuse face 
additional problems, as summarized by Susan McDonald: 
Fear of deportation, cultural biases, 
communication barriers, education and 
economic barriers, medical problems, 
relocation of partners, host country 
perceptions, and distrust or fear of the legal 
system.120 
According to some anti-racist feminists, racialized 
migrant women may view the family as a safe place from 
the harsh realities of Canadian society, despite the presence 
of violence in their lives.121 This only exacerbates the 
vulnerability of non-status migrant women in Canada. 
 
119  See ibid. 
120  See Susan McDonald, “Not in the Numbers: Domestic Violence and 
Immigrant Women” (1999) 19:3 Can Women Studies 163 at 163. 
121  See Leslie Nichols & Vappu Tyyska, “Immigrant Women in Canada 
and the United States” in Harald Bauder & John Shields, eds, 
Immigrant Experiences in North America: Understanding Settlement 
and Integration (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2015) 258 at 259. 
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Problematically, migrant women have indicated that abuse 
either began or intensified upon immigration.122 
Although not all non-status people are equally 
vulnerable, a common characteristic is the absence of 
social, civil, and political rights that are entitlements of 
permanent residence and citizenship. As we have seen, 
non-status women are relegated to the margins of society, 
with precarity as a way of life. Given what we know about 
which migrants are more likely to be selected—those who 
more readily fit the mold of the desirable migrant—it is 
important to consider how the denial of sponsorship further 
reinforces socio-economic inequities that are already in 
place. 
This is not to say that non-status women should be 
viewed as passive victims. As evident by the Non-Status 
Women’s Collective of Montreal, they have agency and 
provide an important voice of resistance to Canada’s 
exclusionary nation-state building project. Arguably, it is 
their ability to draw into question the logics of the 
Canadian state and imagine alternative and more equitable 
futures that makes them perceived as a threat in the first 
place. However, the realities of precarity are inconsistent 
with the state’s foregrounding of the threat posed by 
migrants to national security. If anything, it is their lives 
that are threatened by myths, like marriage fraud, that 
further justify exclusionary attitudes, policies, and 
communities. 
 
122  Ibid at 258. 
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VI. REIMAGINING BORDERS AND BELONGING 
The provision of citizenship “is about the state producing 
and reproducing a desirable familial form”,123 which in 
turn is “definitive of the state itself.”124 Borders are the 
means by which Canada can curate its population and 
sustain “the dichotomy between a civilized, Western ‘us’ 
and a barbaric, non-Western ‘Them’.”125 Thus, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that marriage fraud, viewed as an 
undermining of the border and of the Canadian family, is 
seen as a national threat—notwithstanding the lack of 
empirical evidence suggesting that anyone is in any danger. 
Marriage fraud not only interferes with the state’s ability to 
decide which bodies it will grant access to and 
economically support, it also constitutes a broader 
challenge to social organization through the nuclear family 
and the legitimacy of the sovereign state. 
In the context of the War on Terror, framing 
marriage fraud in the discourse of threat and national 
security stokes public fears and anxieties about migrants, 
which in turn, justifies more exclusionary border practices. 
And, troublingly, the emotive power of fear inoculates 
Canadian border practices from allegations of racism, even 
though officer practice manuals show cause for concern. 
The state can justify its targeted actions by pointing to its 
campaign to protect citizens from migrants hoping to scam 
the system. Canadians feel safer, as does the future of 
liberty and freedom in Canada’s democracy. This story 
 
123  See Gaucher, A Family Matter, supra note 35 at 19. 
124  Ibid at 8. 
125  See Chan, supra note 98 at 17. 
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leaves little room for questioning the broader effort to 
exclude migrants that the state deems both undesirable and 
threatening to national security. 
We must retell the stories that are taken as inherent 
truths; in our context, these stories include those that 
monger fear around the supposed threat posed to western 
society by marriage fraud and more broadly, the Other. 
According to Donna Haraway, “the power to survive” 
arises “on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world 
that marked them as other.”126 These tools are the “stories 
. . . that reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of 
naturalized identities.”127 Perhaps by speaking to the 
insidious violence of the innocent and freedom-loving 
West that threatens the daily lives of those in the margins, 
we can thereby subvert “the structure and modes of 
reproduction of ‘Western’ identity.”128 In so doing, we can 
unsettle the white sensibility of who belongs and who does 
not. This paper is trying to do just that. 
  
 
126  See Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto” in Susan Stryker & 
Stephen Whittle, eds, The Transgender Studies Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 2006) at 112. 
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